
A M B R I Cam public opihioi 

I S FIRST F I V B MONTHS 

of war 


May 5, 1942 





Summary Report of the Division of Polls, 
Bureau of Intelligence, 

OFFICE! OF FACTS AND FIGURES 














. r. .. ' 

«**> ****** r*-* e^-AirfV,^ 


H 

«*W»*f**<*.A«*- 


W l| ft w 

•X <> »i « 4 


D X 1 & t) ;■ i 0 1 % " M J 




X V I % f e H I '£ 


r 

X 


# 

















J * 

• V 
Kit 


t . •• r liVK V;- -fttr hr \i ,'rtf ‘> 4 ? -j- if :;©& v* *: rif/i 



, aoaejjJjCXafrarJ 1c 

/fflaj-'i't c-a mux -5'c 'iitEt 


«• f 

• ‘ • 

-' -\ 

« 




















■ 











SUMMARY AND RJ2C0MMSNDATI QNS 


Five months after the nation v/ent to war the morale of the American 
people was good. Successive defeats in the Pacific and serious 
shipping losses off their Atlantic shores had made Americans increas¬ 
ingly aware of the hard job winning the war was going to "be. But it 
had neither disturbed their majority belief that the ultimate victory 
would be theirs, nor had it decreased on© whit their determination 
to attack the Axis in every way and with everything at their disposal. 

They knew what they were fighting for and they believed in their 
own war motives* They believed, too, in assuming a full share in 
making the post-war world a better place to live in by spreading the 
Presidents Four Freedoms around the globe. 

By and large, also, they were convinced of the worthwhileness of 
the things their Allies were fighting for. Most of them might grouse 
about their neighbors not taking the war seriously enough, but this 
very complaint from two-thirds of them was perhaps proof positive 
that they were not complacent. For they welcomed sacrifices, in 
fact urged more rationing, more registration for war work, more 
price and wage fixing. A chief concern of theirs was that their 
Government was not asking them to do enough. And there was a spirit 
of offense abroad among them which showed signs of swelling into a 
demand for dramatic action at an early date — action directed both 
at the enemy and at enlisting their own full-time efforts in the 
conflict* 

Yet there were certain danger signals, certain soft spots in the 
hard core of national morale. One of these might well prove to be 
the people 1 s isp&tience for offensive action. This spirit of of¬ 
fense would bear watching to see whether it could roll with the 
punches it might still have to absorb before the carefully coordinsr- 
ted counter-offensive of total war could be launched. It might have 
to be spoon fed with further actions like the bombing of Tokyo — 
actions perhaps insignificant militarily, but vitally important as 
spring tonics. 



H <4- 


I 


SHOITMimMJIOOSH QM IEAKK08 




motiwh od# to A.f.*totf ad# tsv o# #xxw aoi&tft ad# te#l& edtfaors evil 
axxoiteo 5a?:? Oi.'tioYl ad# ni: tloelaJk eriaaeOQirS .foofc ®*w oi-.-ooq 
-a.v *neix l Sitaoitaar. %k-n fo&ii eetods oiiaaJW tied# tto e^saoX inlr Ma 
. :f y;> > h"‘' .?,. ■*• t»,w v I ■ rx*d od# to otyy v .: i 

„ e#oiv dtw.DXxf or. * $ y :# lolled ^#Jtt©k53#; tied# b c*ut}&ih vision Ivrd 
t:ol#Y itifcte #*•••,'» tied# :*M- »,ao ■ae,-'o , x6i>li> #1 c-d ton , y;Jyy + «<f Dlnov 
* '.. :G-v*u tied# *‘a '•.. aMtywn bite .*v* y: ehA *n# Xo'yIXo c.i 


tied5 ai Jk-veiled x&Ht bm tol ^i#dg,il ©tew %©d# #sdw woxr^ v/Yfl? 
rt* p *.Va I -VI : ..YY-' ;. .y t oo# t Y;-T3iXeo v3yy >e vitoc x-v; :o 

■..:iu $/ti 1 • ■ "£ . 3 i- ev£I oo i>s4lqt t rtf o & frltew taw~#©o<j ed# 

*9CioI% ed« uuiot* ®Yo.bs$i£ \a/o ' s f tfx-* . 


■•yc‘y ©d# to fmsi&Jtvszoo ot*u ( v .•■. f I .6 iay 

Sd^iat jnedl to #*o!4 *tol etew aai'IXA tied# e^nid# *d£ 

;ti : j tird 9 rl>'MCfH9 xltitfoli ia f mv ©d# $txid&# tea atorfdftie* tied# #i/ocy 
evii.t-oq; looter acfsdteY e*v mad# to e&tld#-© r# rc>ti #aiaX$aroo viyv 

«i t :e.D’’tiiDY' JLeisooX -• ^adtf to'U .#£ieo$Iqroo #©n atav. y.ad# a&dS 

: ! '. ■ ra ,’yu Y^w tel r; ^i. i.vtw -l >. t t tom ^nir.oitfjr: ‘ yoci Bag'ar io«t 

7x- ii, / vtadi ;v */ :-rxlYi^ to ntooaoo teido A »&aixi • Y-av l?im eoitq 

YYY.1 A .d^xroife oJb ©■# iae4i &a.h£&s ioa bjsw vtaecimt^voCi 

.>«v % 


o o7xri ^yxXI^y. 3 to .bfiwoxia iloldw inoi.7, eaastto to 


dtod noiioa *- ##«Jb ^Ixae ae #e aoi^oa tot Bnscreb 


tai’S ul c-wi#-/ Lxs't tiadt #a ka T£mam , “ edi 7^ 


»■ w 


^oiltaoo 








V 


td-t a 1 3 #©<jy #toe f elBxt^ie t^osJ) .oxs^teo etaw ©ted# #•§ 

at ■ .;' •>■•■:'-.:_ ; Y^ittre«ed# to e y . • • ,f - y:--' > r ■ 

©viartY tot ©oi s»x$mqpl a^Iqoo^ ©d# 
®d.t d#xw Hot Yjjioo #i tediodv; ©e^ o# toocf bIx/or eeaet 

-saiXtooo ati&c Ydt ©toled Vtocici* o:; ev.e:C IX ! #o .;-d^ Cm ^ aedoxnj;.r 

mvd #d»l« #1 •Xedorixx.Gl etf bLuoo n • #o # to ©vi ; .x at 1 o - to teiroo bei 
— to %GM$oef ed# eifil ©ooi#o^ ted#ti?l d#iw ;>ol iiooqr- ecT o* 

#ns#toqnfx ■■,llf’jx ' tstf #xs«ollir 4 |i«oi ^q^dtacr uyox^oy 

«o©ino# gn It era 


0 





II 


It might also require an information program aimed more squarely 
at the global aspects of the war, and the need for painstaking 
preparation in the ultimate task of crushing Hitlerism., 

Another possible storm signal could be detected in the people*s 
attitudes toward their principal Allies, The euphemism of lend- 
lease would sooner or later cause bad blood if the majority 
continue to believe we should be repaid for all the material aid 
we were furnishing Britain, Russia, and China, And the day would 
come when the enormous contributions of these Allies would have 
to be translated to Americans in terms of dollars and lives saved. 

The spectre of world Communism still haunted many Americans who 
were not at all sure that Russia could be depended on to coopers/be 
with us after the war, A better under standing of Russian needs 
and problems, plus continuance of Staling current line of stressing 
freedom and justice for all might help to alley their suspicions. 
Unchecked, they might provide a loose stone in the v/all of Allied 
solidarity. 

A third warning flag could be detected in the strong tendency of 
the public to brand labor leaders as slackers or worse in the 
war of production. If the gap between management and labor were 
widened by such press attacks as that aimed in March at the 
40-hour week, mobilization for total war would inevitably be af¬ 
fected, To make a whipping boy of organized labor would be to 
produce disgruntled workmen doing less than their all for the 
war effort. Better public relations between labor and management, 
as well as a coordinated campaign by Government to play up labor* s 
sacrifices in the emergency, seemed to be called for. 

Definitely a J 'soft spot” in American public opinion as the war 
deepened was the uneducated poor section of the population. What 
over-confidence there was in the nation tended to repose in this 
group. These generally underprivileged people also inclined to 
take the shorter view of the war, to think less of the ultimate 
menace of Hitler and more of settling scores with the Japs in the 
Pacific, 


XL*n*.ijp2 rroar manaonq aoid^ersctcl m extopa? oals #1 

:!&#«£ tag* tot Bean ad in « zb* $d$ to e: , XatfeXji ed# #« 

^aidexm: to da## ®d# at nolte, T^'-rc 

s 1 5leoec od# ai *3#oa#?r> ed fiXiroo. jAOgilo **©#• olifjtaeoq leritfonX 

- 

%] *: to tarn nit tl Boold bjt€ euiteo ntBal r xe maoof Jbl^w bbb^Z 
bln i JLeite#j&m ad# Ila not Bl^got s*rf Mxiode ev ©roiled c# eif£i#xioo 

, 

evart btucT’f b \U. 1 X aaadd to t#©t#*rdli#&co wwz'tott* ed# mtiv emoQ 
.her. l. "i<r wiJT jic.i '% ill cl to ain*# at aMt&lxzatk ct &*.t«Xa£at$ ad o# 

odw ©fteOXtefltA. l**tjus&rf I£i#a ttalAxmasoC Bitov to otSoeqa adf 

a&ategooo o# no b$btt 9 q»& atf Bltfoo ai-aexdl #&d# atxra IIxs #4 tfoxx an«w 
eBssa to-Js&xd- to n$## ;>d A .tbv ad# it#tr ejr diiv; 

• •■ . - ' , 1 ...' :• "• ; s; '•■■■■ c . ' r - 

. aj*©ioi§£ira tied# ^sjla ©# cfi'axC Xxigics II* not aoilant Bn# aofcaeit 

t 

to %t>xt£ bm # &#otia ed# at. fjeloeteJb &a b/Moo ^aXl salaam Mldt A 
uli at eaiow ta #jb ©tafwsal nodal J&imnd 0# oXldVq sxi# 

•v%; v *% Kf&s. v ■ 3- tc «*£/•• £*»! njiv •#.-& ••-d# tl *x.ci iojj&ong to 

ad# #jb doteK ai 3 &a*» 4 & #i&d# hh eeatcx do»& -^d Be nab Xw 

■ , •:. ■'. •■ ..•' ' 0 ■ f 0 ># ‘::o:; .; '. . . \ici ■ t ‘:>0 • - i- 4 .<V' 

0# 0d bit ovt •soda! Besirrog^o to \,otf ^aiqoixfer & &*Lm of ¥ Bo#oet 
auM not XI .3 lied# ee^-I ^atoh am'Haw 5 sltam^tb aoi/Boiix 

f l ocf; : :i.-. •• > ’•■’ - 0 rzQiisJ.x'x oi^cU/g 

a f nod jX qn velg 0# duemii^voD JbedxuU^tooo a lies; 93 

.not ooJX-o ref 0# r 3 »rc >a t \,o--w add' ;xi 

%st‘M Btte :u' «olft|.qo oifjhjq molz&ttzfl. at #too H a 

i#.- : un f to x.:o . od# saw J&oxie 

elii# ill o^ocan o# Ba ur-d eiol#an od^ nl a tw enofC# o OiiaB It no o -novo 
o# BanllOdi oaXe eXqoorf h-yeIlvlvqj&Iwu ^Il/ineoa^ - »-•.- r *£-.*©*& 

©# ;ml#Xn ed# to aoaX iftin’# oi ,i 3 W to wsiv toHoiia ad# edjsi 
exi# at «c L ad# d#i^ e.onooa $ailzt$a to atom Bxm nalilH to ooaxsam 

*oi: If - 3 


Ill 


Perhaps “because they looked on the war as of shorter duration, as well 
as “because they had less to give up, they were somewhat less inter¬ 
ested in making personal sacrifices than were the “better educated. 

They were the uncertain elements in public opinion, the people who 
had no expressable convictions on so many of the vital war issues. 

More than other elements in the population, then, they needed to “be 
told in simple straightforward terms the war*s meaning. 

As war brought employment opportunities to millions, made manpower 
a more saleable commodity than it had been in years, there was 
plentiful evidence that the country’s eleven million Negroes would 
use the crisis to improve their status. Vdiile a great majority of 
them would continue to work and fight and die for an imperfect demo¬ 
cracy, their leaders and their press were hammering away at racial 
discrimination, and brandishing the club of a "white man’s war." 
Meanwhile, Negroes interviewed on such vital subjects of opinion as 
the length of the war, the selection of the number one enemy, the 
advisability of all-out war against Japan, and international coopera¬ 
tion versus isolationism gave a higher percentage of "Don’t Know" 
answers than comparable white groups. One explanation of this is 
that Negro attitudes toward the war are less crystallized; another 
may be that Negroes have tended to deliberately withhold their 
honest opinions on certain of these issues. In any case, a wise 
war administration must work steadily to remove discrimination on 
at least the economic and military fronts. And such action should 
be accompanied by an information program designed to sell American 
democracy over totalitarian racial persecution. 

Another large segment of the body politic which showed certain signs 
of weak morale during the first months of war was the second genera¬ 
tion Germans and Italians. Less all-out in their attitudes toward 
the war against Germany, and more inclined to label Japan the greater 
menace, this group might provide fertile ground for the ‘’negotiated 
victory n propaganda of a reborn America first Committee, It might 
also be more receptive to the specious appeal of the demagog who 
would convert the war into a racial struggle — one in which the 
"whites” would all join against the yellow hordes cf the Orient and 
the Tartar-descended sons of Eussia. 

The necessity for carefully controlling enemy aliens in this country 
may also color the thinking of these persons of Axis nativity. Friends 
and relatives of theirs will be interned but great care should be 
exercised to see that none of the honestly anti-Axis refugees are put 
behind bars. Such refugees should be given every opportunity to con¬ 
tribute to the war effort, both as a means of nailing down their own 
loyalties to democracy, and as a method of holding the full support 
of the second generation Germans and Italians. 




Ill 


Haw ,nofto*rirb io on i&w %d$ no tolooX ^©rfd ©ax/nestf ©qfedie 1 ! 

-••rotoA a«al toxtw©aio« $i©w %*&t ian ©vi;; ot aeol .toi %&*$* o*moe<f as 
..fe^,r..«oi'ur "id docf ©rid frT-y; usdd aeelttooaa Xxttoataq $ni?UM ai &»doa 
Q&- ©Xcronq add t aoinlqo oXIdi/c ni adfl^moX© a^dwoxu/ rdd «r::ew \©xf; 
« i 'i&N rid to \\, • .• ,:•;. ..*:•...> :• ”:•» on Aori 

- h v ^.u'o't f noXdBXnc[eq ©rid ul a;:... • ;o risrid ©toll 

wxdd i)tawto tdrife £*3da ©ic-ntii. ni frlod 


,:V: i *’ 1 T ;.:•; 


»n 


Sift 1 . 


., in . £ ./eiii taw aA. 

ao ■ Hrtt&rid , at-ji&x ni ©o ©(5 bod ’$1 & M ^tlliOMOO a£da©Xaa ©toa* b 
M ww no ill i/d adVi-.X© ^^tdnneo arid d«rid e&jx©Jk£Y* frtidnalq 

. 

-otfo-b dfc'st'xsqml* iis tot © 1 A Aon driuit bus attorn od asuxttOLa Alnov tno/ld 
•usioat da V' v# i ri ©tew aae'iq 'cierid X*n& «t©Jh&©JC t£©rid « \. 0 Bt© 

‘Vs- * r I- *11. aj edriri-’* .::• to ototo stfd ^x/iA*.itobte Aab t xicidiiij .to.:. a to 
as noi/iico to ado©t»dj/a Jfeftr fbira no A©v©hrr©dnl aeot^otf ^XlriwxmaM 
©rid t :;ivno ©a - xsctarto: 4 d to ncidoolcc arid ,x«v #d$ to xtotoeX rid 
•at'-qaoc hmot$?:m'xo$cd to: «n®q&t» dtoiii&A tcerw- d&'c-IXB to ^dll.ltf«©’iv&i* 
,} wr.d f no(X n to ©jBdjaootfcq vto^iri js otb^ ftaixioXtoloei axfletf 7 iuoid 

. :y:r • «. . 

: eaal ©t& tttW ©jo,. Jds oxto- d • /* 

?£©rid Moriridriw \X*s dstedilaf? bobavt &vad a$oft$9K ©cf x^ai 

• :;Xv & ,•• •’•-•n o it; , • N -oo > '/X -Ic' 'to ,/ J >,''0 . a\ ; ., 1 ?- 'scjc. 

no noitnoliftltnaXh ©roatpt od \XiAj&a^1a aCtow itena no 1 iB/tXaial:/C jb x-ov 
li rfmo too •; a '.> ©d# tant X $a 

a ftoltoi •' X:'<*» oc ! b©£C£ia©A nol-lBStoluti it© \cf Aelaao.toooB x*d 

r ..?::eid.L tXjj t liott ^tuex joxc^o 


5 1 a j 


OJsA 


eirita Boworfa oi^XXoq ^Jfeod ©dtf to fuar^a ©; ? xjbX. 

-«x©£i"v:, ' j-. ro-i- our #©trt ©dtf ©iaxoir 3l©#ir ^© 

t 

tf ^ d? «©qot» Xsual o$ b^&tXonl $*thbi hns $&alt%if& %rw 

l%t:'Xvo%b,i h ©dt *oix, hmio'tfy ©XiJfxet ©AXvotof M^i*! 4 ©OACdir 

ttii'm $1 .rn X,tl. w •'. oO aoXx©«A Atodoi a In ri>aq;otq 'Sjo^olv 

odw ©dt to U^oc)p ax/oloeqa otU ©vitqooet ©tom ©ci oala 

axftf doX;.(w ai IX60 — i ; .I^XaXo.&'X js oixxl xjsw ©d# i”t#Tuoo A^jjow 
Ail© IraixO s^f to ©oAtejl wcX.X>^ ©dX ikioc I-' ; j AX^r>w **© jldw H 

. .c X 3 im/) 1 to a no i i: © on© o ? © ■»-Ta j tai o d -t 


\tlnHoo vtxtt at urn *: Jc-- -»a©o©H ©df 

. ^©©d# to fcxij. " 

©d .ftli/oda o?&3 | tod jA©iv:©toi ©d XXiw «*xisd^ to a©y -.; - 

ton ©*xs eoe^wtot xXdaeiiod ©x{^ to ©non todtf aea ccf Aoaiotex© 

-iioo oX •^iiU/d’tocruo v,n -:-v*4 x? r>% ad Atooda »©o^xrto*r x£oxr8 ,a*iV>d ouided 
xi*/o *Klerfd hwoA ^xsilloa 'to aoa^m © bb dXo j 4 J^xott© xew add od etodt^t 
j'Totrgx^ I tot till g^uXAXoxf to AoxXte^ a &b A as ««r©A o# 3©XdX«x°^ 

t&MMtl&fX hum auBme® btx co©» odd 1© 


THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AID THS WAR 


Table of Contents 

Page 

I The Issue - What We are Fighting For * 1 

II The Nature of the Enemy - Whom We Should Fight 2 

III The Fighting Forces - How We Should Fight 2 

IV The United Nations - Our Friends and Allies 3 

V The Home Front 4 

Complacency Versus Defeatism , . . . , 4 

Production. 5 

Sacrifice. 6 

* 

Information. 7 

Aliens ... . ....... S 









FX' MA Ouiffii £od 


;»#B 8 ^r & 'to -Id' 


r-Afci-w j . 

I 


r 

4 

? 

d 

T 

5 


tef «W l&ffW - sxiQbZ oil 1 I 

h.tmfiB laci^tf - yp»#' fiito ic jHur&tft - cfi II 



4f.c’io # i' ; “ ©n©H e/vi! ? 

* . . * * Qm'ze'; y,;>xr oh forxv 

• t ... . . . , no Miaj/Jbur 1' 

..SOlliTCiJ/:'/ 

.• 

. . ♦.. . . . nfJs. i ''t::i'i‘, 

.,•■ •1; 




r-Afci-w j . 

I 


r 

4 

4 

? 

d 

T 

8 







The American People and the War 


I* The Issue ~ What We are Fighting For 


Two months after Pearl Harbor the great majority of the American 
people received our entrance into the war sympathetically. They believed 
either that we had entered the war for idealistic reasons — to save 
Democracy, to stop the spread of Fascism ~ ( 63 $)* or they felt we had 
been ruthlessly attacked and had no recourse but to defend ourselves 
(21$>). Nonetheless, it was significant that at this stage of our war 
effort almost 9 V eY cent cited unsympathetic reasons when asked what they 
thought the United States was M really fighting for in the war 11 . Economic 
reasons, power and prestige were among the reasons given by this latter 
group. 


Roughly two-thirds of the people looked sympathetically upon 
England 1 s war motives, and these were about evenly divided between think¬ 
ing that England fights for an ideal and that she fights to defend her¬ 
self. Uncritical reasons why Soviet Russia is fighting were named by 
about two-thirds of the people, although three out of four of these felt 
that the real, reason Russia was fighting was simply to defend her own 
territory. 


The Four By an overwhelming margin the American people support the 
Freedoms idea of having this country ^take a full and active part 

after the war in guaranteeing the President^ four freedoms 
all over the world. More than SO per cent of them in late February fav¬ 
ored having the United States do each cf these five things* 

1. Maintain a world police force to guarantee against 
future wars. 

1 

2* Guarantee freedom of speech all over the world. 

3. Guarantee freedom of religion all over the world. 

4. Guarantee that all nations get a fair share of raw 
materials. 

5 . Help to secure better working and living conditions 
for people all over the world. 

Seventy per cent of the people believed that this nation should cooperate 
with others in guaranteeing all five of these rights. 

That the people are not overly vindictive toward the enemy may be 
evident in the fact that only a fourth of them were interested in destroy¬ 
ing Germany, Japan, and Italy as nations, although another 40 per cent 






x. eW orfd i>rui elgceZ m otvem A 3 d ? 



lot a*m oV £&./>■ — sire#I er.V .1 


itaoiwfl**. ©rid to taotw dsoig ead xotfxaF Ixae$ xsdl® srfdnow ov r i? 
tevoilotf v >r • •xXX».®W^iiiqirt« ibw e&d odrri: ootfB'idao wo foot ai- 

mi od — i«o»*jax Oidailfiofci tet x*jw ted texsdaa &te ev is at £o 

ted •*/ vil/r ^ted io t(w;fS) ~ matoa*^ to teexgs ted qod«3 od ,\ps'xo?ffi9C 
asvlssiffc br&iol cd Ssstf ssTirooei ca ter £na tested do r;l 2 eeliidrrx asod 
%»w tiro to $$ifeda iJU£d d« dated ti • ti ; aav di .eaoJe&do-xoW . .(• 
yted dtetf tetf&a nortw 'sxxq&bb? ted teds ted xo dues x»{{ £ da oar/* iiolb 
oitaoatoS /’xsw ted ni xot ani: dxfe.it ylle©!** aaw a&dadS ted/nTJ ted d*ri*rxrorl^ 
ladda*! a Mo" \;<f nevt^ oaoiuot ted &xtvm rtew afcidaait;; J5 jx 3 iswcq ,arrc8.a©T: 

«OXTT? 


aoqr y X Ib o i dtedsq*ryo Jbe^col olqooq ted to si ited-owd ylrfe/roH 
ass -#-.;cf hahlv £i yl.aev© drools bicw etserfd F /nE ^evldom t,cw a 1 tesJfecr 
-i :ei od ,#d*fe£t tea dted ,bm IftftM ns lot -j t AarJ fenE teid 

ytJ Jb&mtt oibw jgnidrfelt ol «.fog it# dolvo$ yxfw g f u^fi leoi; 1 iicteJ *tJ&a 
diet Bated to x. * aeted rig/ftedlft «©Ic?8$q ted of ••• - dx/ccte 

awe ite texteJo od ylqcifo os;/ ja./tldcfeit a.svr ste vcdi xo box J>>ei ted dted 

•yictlxxed 


oiid d-xc x.j'i olqo® iwoiiftffiA odd iiJfeiect arriirl; s/i'm? as y& 

dxee; evtdoe tee Ilat a eafod yidau©© tixid ^crivari to sail _ 

»-B!Oteeit ur t •: ! dnaJP)isfjx^ ^dc .Noda^x-u/;, x.: *x-. •••/ -■ t ixdts 

-TOt v't 3 xrxdo { odal ai moxid to dr a r xeq 0^ a ?id axoM ♦.bXior s.dcr leyo 


r rol OXtT 
a. -O r . OC 


I.JB 


: T ,■ cxfe »•;;• bodixtU’ odd coin 


daaia^o oodneiBi^ °$ 90*xil ©oxXc^. allows A.:ladni •: .1 

•eisw si/ txrt 

J Iiow odd *ro to Xli-i xJoooix.’i tc lOf ooxt oote^asii) *S 
*t>£vtc > odd Tv sro XXc, to mcf8s*--t oodadifiaO 

uoi to 3ied8 list o do;r «ro;..?d.oa I.G.j dni'd oc-driBratrO .-3 

.alftteodoi*: 

one- fcr» sr ’. - .. u ioddoc 1 .' o rooo od c/--,’' 

iio, ; ' la olqoeo lot 


edBioqooo Jbf,&ciln nod dan o t.dd d&rid Jbovsil^tf oI( o^q orid to dnoo loq ydr:ovo8 

* 3 dil&ii ©«oxid to o v it ,}. d o Ad Jrw 

od yrieof) oo. xrvod ovidol^ ihr yl--r-yr don ox* elqos: eld dB£fi* 
-v^oidsob al te.d«oi©d/iJt »iw ciorfd to ridiirot ylao dsxfd doat er?d nt tiMUbtf* 
dn^o ioq 03 i xldoxsa rC^oifdXa f ono tdaii as ^ladl Jban ytt 







2 




insist that after the Axis Governments have been overthrown and all con¬ 
quered territories returned, an army shall he maintained in the Axis 
nations to police them. 

When asked in February, more than half the population was willing 
to accept the Axis nations into an international organ!zation after the 
war. At the same time, imperialism was renounced “by three-quarters of 

the population which voted against our acquiring any additional territory 
as a result of this war. 


II The Nature of the Enemy - Whom We Should Fight 

The .Humber- Ever since America's entry into the war Germany has been 

One Enemy labeled our !, Number-One Enemy” more often than Japan, when¬ 

ever people were able to make a choice between the two ene¬ 
mies, Japanese military successes have lessened the disposition to look 
upon Germany as the number-one enemy, but the reasons which people give 
for considering Japan the greater threat suggest first, that there is a 
hard core of antipathy toward the Japanese because of racial differences, 
and second, that people look upon Japan as the more immediate threat. 

There is good reason to believe that the vast majority of American people 
look upon Germany and the Nazi system as the real threat to our way of 
life, but the more immediate concern over Japanese gains makes the choice 
between Japan and Germany an extremely difficult one. 


The Enemy To But in April three times as many people thought we should 
Concentrate concentrate most of our effort on fighting Japan as believ- 

on Now ed we should put most of our effort against Germany* (62$ 

to 21$). And this preoccupation with the Far East was fur¬ 
ther borne out by the disposition the public would make of American fight¬ 
ing planes if they were given the right to allocate them. Thirty per cent 
would base them in Australia, No other single fighting front is mentioned 
by more than ten per cent, and only 17 per cent chose the European front 
as against 4S per cent who would send the planes to some part of the Paci¬ 
fic front. 


III The Fighting Forces - How We Should Fight 


All-out The strong policy of all-out war against the Japanese where- 

War ever we can attack them is favored by nine persons in every 

ten, although there is seme difference of opinion as to just 
what constitutes n all-out war ?, . In April (before the bombing of Tokyo), 

67 per cent favored bombing Japanese cities, while 23 per cent advocated 









-aoo ILs Ins cwcif(#'x©T© now! vv.ml «?icomxti:^v<*v nixA *rt# w#l» ted# teisni 
ateA erf# aJt bsateteJbsm »cf XXftxte x&iTa ms , %tri*% a®.t*iotfi-xw# bswxrp 

•med# ooiloq o# axxoiten 

$r:lll £w aav n©i#i;Ijtfq;©g ©rf# "fcXori isatf# aw.sr n ’ xxvrfW 

erf# noites Xnn%*to LmtXlaai&Xsxi m otnl «aolten atxk wC# Jq&jo# c# 

s :c aif*#w.rr>~-o-rrf# \;cF Jb»,ofcirc«a© r i m ISm ,®«i# ^ o o; : # #A *'• •••' 

V*o# Ht«# U.aoJtzIjhK %ttk> im #8i i^vys. /j©#gv do lira k iteXixqoq* sr: 

*’MV ** hit aO 7 If ^ 


W1 1 h^r.-dll c'\' me A: - •••! •■' To <• ,:• t--’ add’ ‘ 


-• 


Al€NKf 3 * 1 X 1 •S&tf «td# oSrtX %Ttm B^AOiram BOfllvi 1 P 1 P& __ 

- . , ■:■ ,• . . . " 7': . 

-one ow# etii r.oov/tecf eolono & ©jfeng. ©# eloa aw* ©J^oo. we 
XcoX o# noiditURj JX oil# bMaasal awl ^aanaoafca aasmaq&Ti •«©&& 

svl$ ® f.con:$ \:. iv:.w s- 0 *smto *d# ted ,vnfc?^ ■>-©~-, ■■•ci xafit ©d* ^ ;^V'.vxs;D noexr 
* %} $ml# fajriit tea-vf# s&temv, erf# mosT* ani:«x te / ;c ic’t 

,Ta€.aNwVU.b t&,Xn&% %q *s&$$•#’ aaamq&l add Xis’-'G# ^iteqiine do awo .biarf 
. fettrffcetal&iavt* e*rofi «&# 4# fisc; -. •> ; cq;.r ;{^o X .. <.">,••:• • . i.fvs 

«».'Cc-e©€ AuBdiwmA So ^I'Toys® #.wr ©rf# #M# ©vailad o# timtmax b4»w% »i awn'S 
It ptf wo o# &6*arf# X&es add an &atet« acid M« tgaacsia, at . ^-\:.c.l 

solotio **£$ ss:a©m uixJbi^ ©a$**£$&£ w?o msonoo ©#*ijbBtti:i aicofii ©if# #jt?a , vixl 

«<iiso #Xtrol^ii> v^ta/c toO bm esqaZ 


v *-■ 


|.\,'L.i'.d ^ : x'.T 

^- f . ,, t ^rr >t ~h -,-. l >m i— r m» jl;» 

^,tF/xdr. vricO 

iW. <■ % • .*■ ?■»■ #—»n >» w» 

wed r. 0 


Mr.rr.d3 «»v •• • • y«?J# ^Icaeq; a,& a©v«xd siiiit Xi*£ri, .u.t d; ; 

-7©.fried bb rvvh* no wo lo #«o« ©#«u#«©on€»o 

^:>c ! ) ^XBStttoX $3ttkt$'£& $«toY>:Q f mt *i<& d-aoxs #uq X Inert,:i ©v .6e _ 

~w v ■ 

-dfi^i'i moIwbiA "to J3k?fii JbXcrow tfrlcx^ noidiaoqolo ©xiJ vd djero unit 

dxtoo T©cr ^d^.ixiT .fnatfd ©feodlB c# dd.U’i s>d# n.©vl^ o r xarf ^ond ;i a cozier %nx 
b&tttZStimi ai framt ©Xgxsia roddn ^ISb^^suA nl d .blxrow 

#H©*xl /i£9(rowl f . ; 6x1# ©sodo #1X30 Tt-c; ^Xno Jbxxa v #js 60 wq xxft# aan# oiocn ^o' 
erf# lo #xao; error o# aamlq; orl# bia»D Xfeow o.dw doro *x«s>qr J 5 .,' aa 

oix 




ri&f! M«rcuc 9 


ed wc..: - aeo^od o.d‘1 


m 


-©*e.dr odd #«ixi:§^ ’iwf #i;rwXi>4 do \oiloq Rioted a «nll < dxro^JA 

V’xrv© xtl ano 8 '«ec 0x1 in bevom't aX xvSv xz^o r>w 

daxd o# aa rotxXqo Xo ©onatalrlii) anrae *i ©^on# X» <n©# 

4o^t:r it*, j^etf 000 ero.'.jci) it! ."iwf #w-XX« M 80#x/di#rnoo dadw 

XataoorJLs #xs0 leg ![!» olixlv $ utlfh> momq&Z ^rcidaioo X^ww't Ir.do 






restricting our attacks to the Japanese f, navy and other military object¬ 
ives”. That the trend has been markedly in favor of offensive all-out 
strategy, however, is evident from the fact that the percentage of people 
who advocated bombing Japanese cities rose from 59 P er cent in December 
to 67 per cent in raid April. 


Tactics Most people who have opinions on the conduct of the war to 

date are agreed that the Axis has sunk ships without warning 
and about evenly divided as to whether the Allies have done the same thing. 
They are only slightly less in agreement that the Axis blockaded or cut off 
civilian food supplies, and just under half of them think that the Allies 
have used the blockade. Practically everyone is convinced that the Allies 
have not used gas or disease germs in the conduct of the war, but those 
with opinions are about evenly divided as to whether the Axis has resorted 
to this method of warfare. People are strenuously opposed to the use of 
poison gas or disease germs by the Allies, but if the Axis should use them 
first, most people favor using gas in reprisal. But the use of disease 
germs was apparently considered so drastic a measure that even if the Axis 
did it to us first, a majority were not in favor of the Allies ever resort¬ 
ing to this method of warfare. 


IV The United Nations - Our Friends end Allies 


Dependability Three-fourths of the American public believed in February 

of Allies _that England can be depended on to cooperate with us after 

the war is over; SO per cent feel that China can be depended 
upon. There was considerably less optimism, however, about Russians rule 
in the post-war period. A fourth of the people either would not or could 
not answer the question of what Russia might do, and mare than a third of 
them felt that Russia could not be depended on to cooperate after the war. 


Lend-Lease Late last winter the public was about evenly divided on the 

question of whether we should send more, send less, or send 
about the same amount of lend-lease supplies to Britain and Russia as we 
were before the United States went to war; but less than ten per cent be¬ 
lieved we should stop sending supplies altogether. However, the trend was 
definitely in the direction of favoring more lend-lease aid for our Allies. 
For in December, this number who advocated greater aid for Britain and 
Russia amounted to 21 per cent of the population; while by late February 
this figure had climbed to 28 per cent* 






~do©f.co v'mtZIJta tfm'ds baa saocaqat arid od aafoadds zj.ro $fridol?d«si 

tzro-llM jrrtSjrc©Yx<? to to ir*y cut vlb© xostf ostf id evJ u. . ' %ori 
olqooq tc o^adnsot^q *>d$ fartt doat a.tfd *oil dn®Mvs si 4 t*vowcff t v^.adfctd* 
tsdraoDaCf it 1 ijxeo t»q P<* me it ©aot soidio erortaqsl ^Jkfioif fcodnoorfs 0 /V 

♦ IltqrA 5fm r: 1 dt© o tot V ) cd 


©d saw ©ifd to dor&ac© ©xld no njictfitqo ©wi orfw ©Xcoyc t*©M ^o ldooX 

§iiAa?ftV Isjufitu- 9 qlrta if axis u jforA ©Vid dsrfd' .fcsstjyi stir s-d 8 p » 

.TVCilrU st'x-i © :•! ©nob f>v»ii esillb ©rid lejfdsA cd m bnhivtb \ltnv® tooda 
lio duo to i/obaafoold oto, erd dtxld dce&®$t^ nl assX ^IdifeiXs ^Xro sib 
asXIlA sifd ' tc tlscl xobuff #oirt bxta ,«sXXc 1 ajsXfirJ 

selllA ©rid darid baoaivxroo r X uti^^ ye xXXsoida&lft *ebBifo©I<f eriif beair eva/i 
3 '^- ‘ d.ov , ;.•.' ■■■'■;:■ -f io'/uor Arid ai *Kto& iiaeili ts i«$ fcitir tin ov .n 
Jbedtosst sari sJbcA arid terideriw od as beaJhril) yXffSTO dxrccfa ©ts snclfllqs ridfw 
AAA -.la^CO'V: rld<! ST« ^Xq r *A A -■/■'' \* o. ■ ©ad#® l ©d 

«sad *s# JbJXrojde sl^A odd .jl d.i • *©£iXX& ®f£d ^<f $»ae«- 

sr • >:':• to v'o.l: k d .If -*. burst at -u's to if toWf ? r cy©s<r daom f dm.-I' 

alxA orid ti aoy© dsrid etrr**j!?R * aLfu&rh cm X^iofianco ^Idtetsqqs saw 
-dtoset *t«va oo • dl bib 

«to bcride «l’Xd od ^nl 


■: .>: ’ ■•■• 


ytncncd’alC nl fcavollutf oLS-irr cr rraalto^casl, :) r r d to sifdTirOt^-a 1 -toff ydllXt oftirac h.L 

tsdlts exr jcfdlv? edBteeoco od no I>s.t>a«q9& etf Jiao AmlfetiK djsxid _ _ eslllft. to 

j ai tr- a? o*(d 

ol.o'j: ^alt u.«ii dxr.c .5 1 1 ^ys'-ifp.o ,nai/,ldqc oa- X ^IffsisBisnco «.• y eza-V *tr.c rjir 


bXirci i- dvr blnoo sXoo-‘:■. "o JJzssci .;■. * q tjs r-d-oc sf/d nl 

. oxor f jh Zssurfl *io licit*.*itp sif# 'W-*" 

•/ ; ip 'l« a:;:wv-[,r.r- ’ >, ■■. ■/ d ' '). r ‘ r -: '■ a.'' •v: , ' : ..'•a"," , ' v •-* 


ivrfd no irobivio \.:rryyo dvodjij as* oiltuq tedfilw daol edviJ aaoa«I --Mor 
» to ••? •, 9-nT; onos l?.Cm>.rf« w tsHdsxfc# Jo \acl$3&&p 

«y s/i M’i nl'-iditl od nal,£c;q.cr !> ©.OB^I-ba^X to dmroito eitt'-s s/fd d.uoo/i 

~scf dix*o 'ct nod .m .t dxrcf of ditt-v Ledlrt oXd ototstf 9 t®w 

Mir Jbatv# Bdi 4 levevil *i®^ds^od!s aatlaqm ^xtltos.s nods McroiCs ©w Lars If 
.8 311.[A t;/c to't ola o - - ; a» — i>u®X otom tr naidoot' .*: ajid at rlofludl^b 

bar* nladtit tot fel^ todaotry DSd^ocT-ba orlw Tadtor* ^li^d , locfmeosd nl to” 
odal yd oI r Xv ;nold.r,Xxrqoq- ©id to dnoo teq I' : > cd J&odiuroatt^; sXn.'i 

«dnr o t p q- S .: t bstfni lo Ias ff ©t cr^i tot rid 




4 . 


War Debts That the war-debt issue may be a rock on which post-war co¬ 

operation will founder is clear from the fact that three- 
fourths of the American people believe at the close of the war that we 
should be repaid for the lend-lease supplies sent to England and Russia. 
The people are about evenly divided as to whether we will or will not be 
repaid. Those who think Russia won't repay us argue that the Soviets 
won't be able to. Many also feel that England won 1 1 be able to repay, 
but more often people refer to the failure of England to repay her last 
war debt*. A fev/ refer to Russia 1 s failure to repay in the last war, and 
about 9 per cent believe that Russia won ! t repay because she is not trust¬ 
worthy and may turn against us. 


The Home Front 


Complacency versus Defeatism 

Length When people were asked shortly after America's entry into 

of War the war if they thought the war would be a long or a short 

war, more than two-thirds believed that it would be a long 
war. At that time about four out of ten persons thought the war would 
last. two years or less. For about two months there was a slight rise in 
optimism and about the first of March almost one-half cf the American people 
who had an opinion on this question thought the war would last two years 
or less. Two weeks later only one-third of the persons with opinions an¬ 
ticipated a war of two years or less. The most recent survey (about 
April 1st) indicates a revival of optimism and once more almost one-half 
the people who have an opinion think that the war will last two years or 
x e ss. 

How The Most people believe that the United States and her Allies 

War Will will win the war, but the number who are sure we will win 

3nd and also write the peace has declined from 69 per cent in 

December to 60 per cent in April. And there has been a 
corresponding increase in the number who think the conflict will force 
us to make certain concessions to the losers (22$ in December; 28$ in 
April). The number who believed the Axis has a ,} pretty good chance to 
Win tt has varied from one to four per cent, and those who thought the war 
would end in a draw went from four per cent in December to seven per cent 
in February* and back to three per cent in April. 

Putting the question another way, with specific reference 
to the amount of effort and time needed to win over Japan alone, almost 
half the people interviewed in March felt that we can't possibly lose 
the war to Japan, but it may take a little time to win, and about the 













,'oilffcr GO 4 ${f V* *'^’ v '• 

~wtdi' dadd $!M*X trfd rtvO'tU' U£©X* 3 X t©/?rwt* fliw hold.orac© 

9tr #js/{# *xftw erfd lo eoolo add A* •vellotf alcroacr tsst t adtimrot 

,®JU;atrf to* JfrxbsX^w^ cd dGOD »© tlaesrn 9rs©I-i>xi©I etfd *ol vixcra* *c r blvod*. 

^— — - ••■■ — —- 


to • Jon II Iv t> Iliv; ©w mi ld wtw o.j aa Labtrib \lr< vo #xroo*<u axa tic ©«<. 

.,« « >«. ». . MM.. *• . ......... Ms. -^ 


«r f n» « ^ < 

ftn r i' 


.••'..>/■ -1: d ♦gow si oAr ssor *1 

, ! " « 1 

dOBX x&d cd to extTlat aiii ot xvt®z placet. .r^iTto sic<4 drc 

m «1»W ImI C»dJ / 3* 0# 0 t t 0d i . .i'ooft XftW 

- in t -• • ? - ’ .'■'” ‘!('i ®veiled Ms 

CXfci V&fTOW 


,ax/ rr.xtfd 


■: v . ., 


Ino t K ssioK 


T 


; 'C SX/^VCT vs tar^ fqrol 

» l*Wl«W***** IV. A-/. +»•«—« 1 », WlllHWW «»» ’* "MTUl 

i .. ' 

d*t©d© s XO TV r, 0l B t<f BlirOtf T3W ©dd dd&GOdd X®^-j — ^' ; *xfd 1JBU 

$ncX a atf jbXtrow d* tof# Jbtve r - 

hi w tttV ©dd $L*?,ssQd$ Btwa^&q ct>d to Arc rvu't dircds xzl$ iiuU *A .xav/ 
xti ©tairr d/f^ila a «im ev»dd a.rld^om wd sf°Jnrt>cte *to$ .natl r ctf ©wd.daxl 

slco^ r aaolrvA er-d lo \:L:.H>*f © vHc^ls doiisM p fco d.^T.rt 3 t tiro©:'*. iv^ >-:b •;..:.f;tqc 
cnc>s^ cwd ioal IXgow mr ©rfd ddgxwrtd xcliaaxfp slcJd :o atixciro g* \d ox iw 
-Ga *?.*. olr ;'s,t g'w iv ©ixe^^at eri^ to ^I:t< r^Jxii e ir*?-’ < r' * ’ ^® r xo 

cUfCUs) %;■"• vtxi©o» , i f>y: v; 3©X xo r t*‘3% C'.»'i Id f ±!v; 4 ••i:©!^ 

).Lqd**M0 isfJOixXe ti<?o£g aoxxo Jbits lo laviv^x b (^s.C XItcA 

•jo 91BQX 6^^ ttel I.vi'v I'ctf tioii? rfnlcJt GO'irtJfqo tt*s «?v»jf o/vr alt o»cr erfi 

> ; 1 

>;> i 

♦ - . • . . 


b&ISIA ted X:ia ie^s^3 l>3?ir.U t«c(# ^voilocf ^iqo^q tao ' atfT vf ?K 

nt:4 f.JJ 00 otxn - 'ra ©o ; - r xvo-r-rri iro orl^ ohr XI iv IX. # w -ijn' 

al i/iio?) toq {;d ««« ? -z^i sft 'oiiitf ool* fti& .6 g£ 

B ' -i.f'4 (••'•' K :'r ••’f-I: »J A, :c f /' X/ref' {-fi Of ‘.c^dnsosT 

00 xc= 1 1X1^7 itu "i.ro:, iLfiidit o/Iv x®d3Lcrci c?dd x i: 9-i^oxorJ ^- iDfiorr^ *n< 0 

W M 

Gi ':<?■' rtf -w.iii 1 ' )< at ' •-.; 9 r ji>:;0/ t.'3‘ of 3 aoia 3 i:>g€® Glad : -x. ; -••;' ci r; 
od aatcuido £qo$ ^dcrotq^ a aad six/., edd BavalXscT odv/ xetfcutt edl «(Ilxc a 

.• 'iVU < l/T^D •*•'./q *xx/3'i cd OGO fiffrt 

dneo oovsk od rtetfis^oaC nx t.100 toq wo! f'O^t dosw tfi il .; nl bao tLrov 

*Xlr ' r .. ni diioo teq od ooci ):rx ,& i‘ 


eoafirotzi: dc' iv ,^ew 1 -osm lo firzvr, •.■•;.• i 3 fss*i 

d 9 oc-Xa , r *.Gfs£« ;i3c:^I* t«*v 0 r ? ;v? od fj^Jbooti er ’:d ditc'-rl:© ':c d/xxro.^ »i;d 0 d 

1 ;■ rid Jltft daiiiM iii dwslvtadGl 0/. ;. r< o' 


add dr/cla Jb/ra <ni.v: cd ©i«.tvt alddlX 0 $ 7 i>.d ^gati d X tof! ,Gtac»l od x- 


;w 


©dd 





5 


same number thought that if we don’t work a lot harder than we are now 
we won’t win the war against Japan. Less then 3 per cent of the people 
felt that we have practically licked them already or that we have virtu¬ 
ally lost the war already. 

It might he argued that the 46 per cent who say we ’’can’t 
possibly lose” have some of the characteristics of complacency, but the 
case built on this evidence alone would be tenuous. To discover whether 
the people themselves believed their contemporaries were complacent, the 
Division of Polls asked a nationwide cross-section in March how serious 
they thought the public was about the war. 


Seriousness About two-thirds of the persons interviewed did not feel 
of the that people are taking the war seriously enough, probably 

Public indicating that they themselves do take it seriously. 

About one-half of these do not have any suggestion to of¬ 
fer for making the public more aware of the seriousness of the war, but 
those who do make specific suggestions mention rationing and enforced 
economy more often than anything else as the one thing that might make 
people more aware of the seriousness of the war. More truth and publi¬ 
city is the next most frequently mentioned proposal. 


Probability People are more prone to anticipate enemy air raids on 
of Air Balds the Pacific Coast than on East Coast cities, but the dis¬ 
position to anticipate raids on both coasts has increased 
since early January. In early March about JO per cent of the people 
felt that air raids on the Pacific Coast were very probable or fairly 
orobable in the next few weeks. About 5$ P er cent anticipated air raids 
on East Coast cities. Most of the people who thought air raids probable 
believe that they will be few and far between and will not come regularly. 


Production 


People’s In early February 55 P er cent of the American people felt 

Contri- ttheir job to be connected with the war effort either direct- 

bution ly or indirectly; 40 per cent thought their job had little 

or no connection with the war effort. But almost three in 
every four persons believed they were doing something to help in the total 
war effort. Regular occupations and volunteer defense work accounted for 
40 per cent of the things people said they were contributing by doing. A 
fourth said that they were buying defense bonds or stamps. 












voi d'A ew mrfd to X a jCiow d^oX) m ti tocftnmi earsu. 

• Iqoet. erd to dneo toe, £ r ;rfd eibB\ •o&qaT* Sanborn %qw vdi r. i v d f ncv iv 
sv^sif iv dorfd to y^ssii^ nsrid borfoil yllaoldoatcr $ys r i ev t-"r 1 viol 

*\&B©tl0 ©rfd ^ct I yl I* 


iH^ao* ©v ya-. o/fcf d-eo toq ©ad Aejud fte&ata acT #1 

©xf d lex.* 4 yon©aaXr.frcOT> te a&idiltedoswto ©rid to tr.on *-md 11 ©aoX yldiaaoc 
©ftV tOVCO.alft OT i d *8*0 

end «dim clique a otww **9 it®toqmt #m>o tisnd ftevsiXecf a&vXosiaflMid ©Iqoocr *i£d 
exro 1 ?© * vcxj do t -tM « X iio i o' n 3 3 - ?! if o ts> sJb iwixd 1 dBix a nju ’* 2 X c* % to n o loiv K* 

atfl dxfoaV, saw oildJKr 5>di dxfrncrkt fond 


loei d< ••! ijii> Jbowaiytodni. axsoaioo' arid to aJbtlrid-owd diretfA ay > -a; )it*8 

* ■ m * » — r» . K.^»<mi<i|ii i u - irnum 

X/dadofq f dvjcroxxo yjairojttoa rt,w ©ifd ^fltdad ©ts ©Icosq d*rid »rd Jo 

.ylj zoit©« di asL ft *«nrl©atr®rid y©nd J&rid aalft ■ fli 
-1' od jctc f :d *©;.j£wa or&d dor. of; ©?'©od to t Xaxx-e JJC firo&A 
crjyd ,tow add to ©sanexfottee ©hi to $x$wb ©torn oilrfmr odd &aJb£*ri ioo tel 
J&totolflo bxtfi ^ninoidAt noJtdxxem aneidftag^xra oitXooqa odAirf oJb odtf saoild 
. t •;■■ • ; ; t ' ! Z ' - :\ f ■' - Xr •■■. .m:* . . • ?? -'. ;/". • ” -•■•;:**«*? 

i aO atanaxroltai © d co ©Xv:x/a •"•'■ 

♦ Xkiaoqo # rrr .twineidxitnt ^XdA^x/poi"!; daom ■? xan # 3rd ai ytic 


nto abmrt *xt& '$>wm -aSnqloktm od smiq i iqk &*m olgoa"' ^diXXtfArfct*? 
-sifi add dm; t **:bfl'j f%&o$ d.na'£ rxo aadd daatO r>add si rrz tlA id 

». ii —i humi ■»**»*». m» lM w> n 

B©33©*torX W9ri avwton die € no 8.f>Jts^ odiqioidna od ncldlsoq 

• ' . • • . ■ 

’tJfcXsl -to tldicfoac T- r '^ f oxew diwaoD oX 1 ti»a c i add m> &£>!&■ t -rJbo d^d.f 

zi:?, Jb^d ••.^iloidn^ dx:eo *rz;' 0 § dirodA * a&.zm WO'i dx*?/- sod nl old&cfoiCi 
o Cc4«fotfr ?r-X«iy *x.U dr^noxid oitw o.f : : coq; e.ad ‘to d jor-! .soid I'o daacO .• o 

• oiioo don IXlv &is?i rs. ewJttf ia a Ana w»l ©cf IX.fr/ ysdd d^ri'd »T®XX^cf 


nol£tmfrg^5. 


dlo'fc oXqooQ nsoi-x#ioA ©Hd lo d/iao teq c?c! yl^o rtl p* © Xqoel 

do a tli) Totldio d-tolls tej^w add ridiv? he do anno a ad od tfo(, -.HdiioO 

sXddil X^rl tfot tl^xld dtC^xrodd dn©o -xeq 04 p$idoo'iihni to yj nciiM' l 

ai &»rtdf <ao #ajto dx/fi #/fd iidXv 'oenxoo on to 

Lsded exfd ui glad od yiMte vp-r ^al'oJb e*xew vpxiJ* l>©v#iXad snoeieq *uro"t ytwo 
tol hoditmoM Mtow sail'- . • nXov J5«e sra’fr^car'^Ki .• :m.az! • r -. 

A .y;?ioi) yd ^i-.idnditdnoo etow ysnd Jbfr^a eXciosc, sgrMd ^rid to dneo teq On 

.sqtsada to eoitotf saitete.h >vifr;jBtf anew ^edd dnxid bi a riittfOl 








6 * 


Group Con- A clear majority of the American people think that Farmers, 

tribution Executives, and Workers are doing all they can do right now 

to help win the war; those who feel that there are other 
groups of people who are not doing as much as they could ( 25 $) mention 
the Government, (Politicians, Government leaders, and Congress) most fre¬ 
quently, Labor leaders are the group most subject to criticism; two out 
of three persons with an opinion on the question felt that Labor leaders 
were not doing all they could to help win the war. 

Almost two-thirds of the American people in March approved 
the idea of women registering for war work, and women themselves favored 
this suggestion more often than men. 


U. S. Pro- Although a fourth of the people M don*t know M whether we are 
duct ion producing more war material than either Japan or Germany, 

versus Axis four out of five persons with an opinion on the matter of 

war production think that we are producing more than Japan 
and her conquered territories. But only a small majority of those with 
opinions think we are producing more than Germany and her conquered ter¬ 
ritories. Thirteen per cent of the persons interviewed think we are pro¬ 
ducing more than Germany and Japan put together. 


Sacrifice 


Prices and Almost everyone has found that prices on most things have 

gone up since America entered the war and even in February 
most people felt that prices had gone up M quite a bit w . 

More than two-thirds of the people at that time believed that prices would 
go up more in the next year, and most of them thought they would go up 
quite a bit. 


Eighty-four per cent of the persons interviewed favored 
Government regulation of prices, although less than half of them knew that 
Washington had already started doing so. Sixty-four per cent approved 
Government regulation of salaries and wages. 


Rationing Most people feel that the Government has done the right thing 

in rationing rubber (S 656 ). People are slightly less disposed 
to think that the Government is doing the right thing in rationing sugar, 
but 78 per cent of the persons interviewed favor sugar rationing also. 
Twenty-three per cent of the respondents think that there is some chisel¬ 
ing in tire rationing, and dealers, merchants, and manufacturers are the 
group most frequently mentioned as chiselers. 

There is wide-spread approval (73$) the idea of ration¬ 
ing all materials in which shortages may develop instead of waiting until 
there is a real shortage* 













dad# dntxftf ejuqjy dfeo exfd lo vdiicttfw i m&Io A 

i »w* . r> ro, «»i«r vm* 

.• (; b Mrf# XXe Stfi /• ;.a c^i'. 

tmC# ' ere* ©Y©rtd d.add Xoal ©dw eaoJtl# ;*tBW add ft tv qlarf ct 
flcJtoasfli (i^3) Jblffoo \axf# a a do,.w a* ^cio# ioxr air. ©dtf ©Iqoau- *to $ 

~r:i. riot: (3 -iOT.\sttC • t *i»jkaai dxra^ircevcO ,«xi.aloldlIc v t) t dxior..rr:\ ron ©x.-:d 
W& jf^ioidlm ## lb #® :af>s©I •jtocf&J *xXSx;-rp 

ii©te©I *x r Kf«3iI tedt tlmla rtolvtsaxrp ©i.t nc /rclalqo xu; Ifli* tfataioor »97iit 1© 

*ro&w ©if# nlw cX©rf od oI/joo \or\f I la dote ©ta* 


barvoTc.qa rb’saM si alnroaq mol*x wA “tit It edtlrf£~w# d*scm£A 
bsioval Bovlaaaredd £9mow Me ,:#*©* *xow iol $jffl to# a i^r* nanimr 1© .tret ’ © 

msti net!© ©tcm no id" •? / dt 


e«ae ev Tarft*rf,# l 1 ut" ©Icroat; - '.fit 'tc wTirol a rf;yroxfd Lt 

TO 0J* c : -:.X» mritt© ft?:;;-,# |»itW^ TiW r TOW ^trloxsftOTq 


io it# $&tt d/tt &€ ac ialq© 
Ltoqjt& flail# o*x©m $xti ©ju$>GTq 


m rfthf anea *©• ©Til xo tm> isso\ 
ms on jteifc Airt irr ;.tDirft©iq tbw 



5 SITS TO V 


ll#tv? saodt xo .•'• -a vl/ju *x*ff 

-rat Mtenpotro t:u ; oas x^s’-ta© mtft oti 
-OTr ©nr ©w dairt I>©waivt* titi ©noaTdc ©lit 


, s > x 'Xv. ;r 1 Tie t ft © t. cxrpxroo t© rf ft xia 
(rj » •,: i m 3teixl* ^roJtsiq'o 
lo j *nr> *xar jftSO^Tixf*' , •? 0 t‘IC41 t 

A. 


,'i: ./.■'■'{ j e;, : od tfx/e n Oaa v;i)ifenT ©0 a-ydt 


©tom sixloxxJb 


©orttTxvr 


[)£L£l ;» 0 fi f*rwl 


V 


J.A 

• «».aH W ■ » » » IT HWIW ^ 

V> 1 %^. 


t&varf t|0lil| t*iopj «o aaoht hsw/t wM bm^xtr? $zkm£A 
.Taxrxtf©^ xxl novo .bim lijtr ©ift i)a*xetr;© ©Ofila w ex>:op 

/‘tid .3 ©iix/j^ a;- 3.r?o^ bast evottc tr.ui dial *£qwq t&O"- 
Jblxrm 8so t*i>i bm&tl&d ©mi# #4xf# alqoeq edt 1c s&tixftf-ov:# ixedi a\; < 
cx ©5 Ilxfow ii'A-ijofi# lo c^aci? trte #x$n aK# ai ©Tom cxr os 

icf a ©^iup 




1)©tovjr 1 &3v/©iv'ietfat txio^Teq add lo tx^o T»rr -t£fol-^#xft|Jt^ 

#arf# wen?[ <asi{# \o IXsxl xtord 938 X de/Jtxtt.t- t aeoir.g lo xiciialxr:,©'! #r©fiux t Sc > vo'0 
XdTOTqqa inoo ttk 1 -^dx' t- *oa said) brix-i#a had 

bom ■ •• la© lo xx g it gaT ,' • 


#xfelT od# ©xio.6 ©ed #««©■;«*!•▼©») 9t r d tsrf# e£< :ac #«cvt r\xixxoId.ei l 

# Tft$if9 -sphtol**? at %fih'iJ %■ ©itt ai #r:Si^TT©vo%i ©d.t Oatdi ti 

*03 Ib %nlmlv&*t -u\^m TOral twaiviolrri aaoaisq add lo dxta© Toq it ^" r < 


-laaiiin «ae« el a-caxfd u.add 

' W N-* 1 > '« W—WW » * »» »>•' * » )■»»• » 

odd o'tb 0 \*aixrdtxolxrxxBin Mb 


•ixti t adrra.Moqae.T ©dd io dj.ao Tea ©airid-vtnawT 
IWltilii . • Ir#©fc hm <■ luoid^ 'i; 

4 »r i u >. m k — i 

*3T©Iteirfo bb ha.aoidxB« ^Xdxxe//.-' ) 9'xl d-?om cx/o‘x: 1 


-noidxiT lo aahi odd tcI (j^t) XfiVOTqqB MoTqa-shiw ai aiedf 
lidrti/ ^.xid^v lo baedani qoI©t© 1) Qe^adiorlft .foixfw xrl e lo t'fp$&tn L£d. ^xii 

* ^d*X( dB laei .» al ©taxi# 






7 . 


Information 


Most people say that they get most of the news about the 
war from the radio, hut there is some evidence that in recent months 
people have come to depend somewhat more upon the newspapers* Between 
one-quarter and one-third of the people say that they can get short-wave 
stations direct from foreign countries on their radio* 

Of these, perhaps one-fourth to one-half have ever listened 
to a program broadcast from a foreign country. England, Germany, South 
America and Italy are most frequently mentioned as the countries from 
which broadcasts have been heard* 


.Radio About 10 per cent of the persons interviewed say that they 

Programs have listened to ”£his is Ma r rt and identify it as a week¬ 

end program. Sixty-nine per cent said they heard the 
President’s Hkap Speech” end 50 per cent heard all of it* About V eT 
cent of the respondents read the speech, but less than half of these read 
all of it. About 10 per cent of the people neither read nor heard anything 
at all about the speech. Xhose people who did hear the President’s speech 
were generally more all-out in their attitudes toward the war 1 and more 
aware of the seriousness of the job ahead. 


Censorship Most people felt that the Government did the right thing in 

holding back the news about Pearl Harbor, even though two- 
thirds of them believed in early February that some important news was 
still being held back* In January almost two-thirds of the people felt 
that some important news about the attack on the Philippines was still be¬ 
ing held back. And at the seme time, three-fourths of them felt that the 
Government should release news about our losses M as soon as they are con¬ 
firmed, so long as the news doesn* t actually help the enemy h A slight 
majority of American people at the same time approved the idea of a Govern¬ 
ment spokesman to write the war news for the papers and broadcast it over 
the radio. 


Accuracy of fwo-thirds of a national cross-section interviewed in early 

Government March thought the Government was giving the public as much 

Information information as it could about the fighting in tills war with¬ 
out helping the enemy* One-half the people considered the 
war news the Government does release to be accurate, about JO per cent 
thought the news made things look better than they are, and 6 per cent felt 
the news erred on the side of pessimism. 









nold^rnc '•n t 


©lid dxrocfo awoa to daoni de$ ye.ffd dand y**a ©Xt' 0 »cr daoM 

sdtuotu fasos'i xil dssrfd son© hive Liao’s ai eiond di/tf ,omo** erld wnl *iv..v 
coawdeL ,onet ,VT8V©it arid 1 noqxf ©toiv dm'V a mo.a batqsh od 8300 ev?;d © ftoeq 
©Yaw-dioxin ds>>j itBo y»iid dBrid y*a ©lower arid to Ijiiiid-oxi© bna leSTztsp-ono 

♦oiXtsn liosfd xu> ’9i r xdm;or> its.X eiot si©*:t doaiii) art©id -d® 

beeiedsiX •xe/o awd ilv.'-o.oo c?d £fdrorol-«m© aq&r’Yaq ,?£;arid IQ 

ildroS <\LmvToi) t biu*l&hl .yidnixo pistol £ r.oit dav;oJ soio i-^T^ciq • )d 
woti* tslidniioo add an i?3iioi:d£t®fli yXdiiei/pei'x d*0M sib ;•/...* *0 ‘ismA 

. £ ©i' n 6 9 cf »v^xi a d :j .s on 9 c • to : 0 t «r 


0 i&fij 




yadd land y.-0 j&sv/sJtvxsdxri auoaietj; arid so due.) *xocr 01 dxxodA 
~£ 9 aw a ■; i d i yt i: d .n a/. X .6 i * a ■« si »i d f * ‘ od 5 on a da 11 s *» d nm 

': *mod %&dS blsa dm>© t**q ©jala-^dxiS . s jbJ»l 

.di 1© I la liaai dxieo isq 0$ bxm *if * v f d• 4 ■■•■■' 

l »sr aasrfd to tlad ti &i d sj©x di/ef ./losses add is* si wnohnc • . add 1c >jn&o 
veil;idyrw itaaoif 10 a Jibs? isddlen ©Iqoaq odd 1© dxtso *xec 01 dJtfOtTA •dl so XI© 
jlo< eova s l drs.'l)lo3'x <r i arid 'ia >xi .1 oil;/ ©Ic<* #q eat :, s *4 p©:H j e: d duoX* XX - dn 

010 m l>xL-i law s:.(d Jbnawod aeiurdidda ilsdd ill djJO-XJXi oio» ? yIlaie. 9 ^ s*xew 

. ■ > ■/ not 0. 5 10 Dll, ^ d vo ^s v vi 


[ji.trwzcatx&Q 


11 i ^nlXd dd^ltc odd XIX* dif©^i(t®v©€ add tfstft dXe't ©Iqoacj dstoM __ 

~c -id ^xreiii i ">ye f ‘xou’i,.. .. l*x . s. dwod« aven end 2 fOncf v;,.; >Xr>d 

saw 3W0.fi dxmdioqmi enun d.ydd y-muioXOl yXxse nl Jbevollec modd lo aibiiiid 
diet olx cv: aqd lo avilXi-ovd daonXs ytoidajfel> xi.'. .loot bled . aioc XXida 
-etf IXlda abv eeciqqlXld'i ©fid no xlojadda ©rid dxroua owon dxn,d*iocfal eoios dand 
«dd druid dXox isad-d lo &: r fwol-9S^d ,amld •m&&8 oild da AisA ^o»ja ^Ia. r . ^r:l 
^nto ©Ufi yerfd aa xtoos aa Vi aeaaoi ix r o dxrodB m®n oeaelo'j -5I//o.i3 disemnioto:.^ 

: - - . 9 © t 

verityc,, » lo a©J&i ©dd Xovc-icgA orsld sens odd da &Iqc9cr nnoltoeiA to ydiiof*aia 
*tevd dl dSBO^BOtcf X»m 3i*er;aq edd 10 I Q^en *sms arid ©diiw od o^mae^oc a dixom 

, .oioai add 


iv .;r. vx ci 
dri et sr; eye v . 
O'Oli/.-V.vO"; i. 


yl-rao tl fcew. f.v-o ini: ‘sd jv-/ vx to 1.. sr ij-^o: ^ ?:d ao^L .d*-tsr. 

jcCooui sa odAfxrq add x'Jvl^ s»% drrana^arvov add dd^uoxid donsM 

-ddl*/ n«v aid'd dl ©rid tw&H hint 9 di aa nold^'/e'tel _____ 

add i>eo©5i:onoo elqvac; add sieX-enO s-imeno mU tystvled dire 

daao 'ieq OJ diroda ,©d.8*ur©»£ ©d od eajsaXat ■>.e©o dr.o.!ioiovDv) avid -r/»a t## 

dial dni?o nee, 3 Xhb ,en-i yond /icrid led dec atoel eonird ar-niti swan arfd dd&iforid 

'Jr© alia old ao bom &ton arid 




8 . 


Allens 


The alien problem loomed numerically large to that half of 
the persons interviewed in January who guessed that one or more out of 
every ten persons in the country v/ere aliens. When asked what the United 
States should do about the aliens who came here from Axis countries, about 
one-third thought they should be deported, and almost as many mentioned 
interning them. 

People were about evenly divided on the question of whether 
there were aliens in their communities who were not loyal, with about one- 
fourth of the respondents having no opinion. Three-fourths of those who 
thought there were disloyal aliens near them didn*t think there were very 
many. The Germans were mentioned three times as often as the Japanese as 
being disloyal. The Italians were mentioned somewhat more frequently than 
the Japanese. 


A survey in early April indicates that people think the Ger¬ 
mans are the most dangerous alien group in this country (46$), and the 
Japanese somewhat less dangerous (35$)* But taking the Japanese alone, 
three-fourths of the people believe that those born here but educated in 
Japan are more dangerous than those born and educated here. Almost as 
many think that the Japanese who were born in this country are less danger¬ 
ous than those born in Japan. Only on the Pacific coastal areas were the 
Japanese named as most dangerous. 

There is virtually complete approval of the Government^ 
policy of moving Japanese aliens away from the Pacific Coast, and 6o per 
cent favor as well the moving of American citizens of Japanese parentage. 
Two-thirds of the people think that the Japanese who are moved should be 
kept under strict guard, and that the Government should decide what work 
they will do. Twentyeeight per cent favor allowing them to move about 
fairly freely in their new communities and 22 per cent believe the evacuees 
should have something to say about the sort of work they do. There is al¬ 
most an equal division of opinion as to whether the evacuated Japanese 
should be paid the same wages that other people get, smaller wages, or room 
and board only. 








to \S&i* ob U c 4 o&t*! iimool mld&tq o&Jt£$ &dT 

\o Sim itm to $m $&d$ toteQamrg «uXw ft! k&w t?t$S ai aavstaq, erf; v 

i>i$jta J arf? cjt-r;V -bo>‘aj& mdW o*i&w yptSai }do «wiJ .* * 9-.cc■; , xici jx©v v:wr® 

&fft& ,aelT^ r*£foy «Jh>. jro*xt salad ©mo ucw ®m£.% ©4$ $./ otf* o.o Mi/Cxlt ac-Jjs-tS 

oa ton ;.?!& itos ,.6*». toqsJb otf A lijcdfe xoa.* $.d%irodf h%ldS~no 

»mtLS 'gnlcttiSal 

t^'vI *- - Cvf 1© •/*$ no hn&lvkb %Smv* Sm4& ® ,; . 

*<3110 Aired,*. rftitf t ItitvoI Ion cn»w &d> :9liJU*ffar«>3 sl^rftf is l es:~tte ••» ©ted A 
©dw e^odit to »d$TL r o\i:-*'ex *xtla i^o a ^fUtaid etna-broo^i eot t< •'•* aroT 
" - ith** <: '*:^, .:■ ' .. j f . Mtft *•** fiiltls la^OltM Min ©liitt /• •<•:>♦:; 

■•;■ : .. 1 ■ ■ : ■ > • :\'-,iv , \ : -f. •. .'/-<■ * • ’ •• .; ; . V , ;>rvi 

msiS \SJfftuw&t'l otm S-sil^mm bmtolSam^ ©w* amt Mil wfX ^XBXol^tb W l - n ^ 

t&fi&’m-i"'* t-.df 


tolls Mssti i $.f:fo»?r AarfcJ aeSmothat X.teqA .:X Y/^lira A 

jxJt dxut , (^cW) ® foi$ ci cgno^ net! -: ftirMft&ttftfe S»am ©dX i ^ 2.a#re 

«onoL* ©cut aate&tf £©€. * (c<^> ; ««f0T %ml tailors©© aifusAq&fi 

uA ijdJ'BO.wf'o ted rxo.d fjftibd- **&ti SsdS ttv&ilod oXqc-vq $iU to *:.IS 

%n i & c'-ijA .©wd joo^-V-.oav-£aa srxcd v# odS tm£S smte^tiBh ®iqh a*»e aEicp/^ 

"C 0 ^n>:iJb a r&l &*m xzS&jjqo aM# al .an.4 otc» irxiw &aoo.s<^iXi tedt rlxsldl %mn 
axljr "a-u'T>, Xo^qaoo ii‘lA no \;L\J .i.^cuai* /ii otoo e>oi .; x id; « -c 

Sam v -' f?a«r a.... ^ 


1 .: 

•£;>r/ : .i f:® tfmQ& oXltK&i enS fiwu a-fteida ejs,* u.»T> &/»Ivon to ^o^Xoq: 

M.^-vi’.^r^.q; to x.'Xtesi^A^ to g, ;.tvc«s Si^'t I/^w *& 70? 5' Jrxo^ 

i Olfjt iMtfCc Ofn. Va • - *? 

Atm $%thf $joi.’ch hlmdM f-.os ,/:tk,ju- ; ^ah^« %&hsw U..ot( 

■ . • 

e soxttmvv^ aiii otoXX- d $n©c S»S te«- atrl^lffr^uoc. wt».;s tlnciit .al xisvt‘i \lt tvt 

•od ^iito drscw loitw .©/{# txio^ 

oaorr.qjDu Jh&$Asmm*9 odS tftltm W oS *a uoUUq t p to atUtirlJb bzifo3 x\,e Seem 
woo7. 'to *8®«>iw 7 oXX«m^ ^Xqooc 90*^.,w mu? oxi^ bx/iCi ad JbXiroilsj 

•XXno X»7^oc bn© 


